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ISSUE ON APPEAL
The narrow issue presented by this appeal is whether Draper
City had a duty to Kenneth Snell to place a 40 mph speed limit
sign on the east side of a one-mile stretch of road between its
southern-most boundary and the intersection where Kenneth Snell
collided with another vehicle.

Appellants seek to establish an

exception to the well-established Utah rule that a municipality
does not have a duty to erect traffic control devices in the
first instance, but only to properly place and maintain those
that it does erect.

Appellants argue that, by acting to place a

speed limit sign in one location on a highway, Draper City
thereby obligates itself to erect signs in other locations on the
same highway.

Appellants also seek to have this Court reverse

recent rulings and abandon the public duty doctrine.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Draper City was granted summary judgment in this case on the
basis that it had no legal duty to erect a speed limit sign.

The

undisputed facts set forth by Draper City in its Motion for
Summary Judgment were not disputed by appellants in the trial
court below and it properly adopted them in determining there was
no legal duty.

In their Brief, appellants correctly set forth

six of the seven undisputed facts, but omit one aspect of finding
of fact number 7.

This finding is set forth here, with the

omitted portion highlighted:
7.
Prior to the accident, Draper had posted a 40
mph speed limit sign on the west side of the frontage
road which was visible to southbound traffic. Draper
City had not placed on the east side of the frontage
- 1 -

road any speed limit signs, or other signs warning of
the intersection, along the one mile stretch from its
southern-most border to the gravel facility road.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On October 13, 1993 Kenneth Snell was returning from a Lehi
animal shelter, where he had picked up a load of animals to take
to the University of Utah.

While traveling northbound on the

frontage road to Interstate 15, he collided with a truck owned by
Cazier Excavation, as it was turning eastbound from its southern
route onto the dirt road accessing Geneva Rock's sand and gravel
yard.

Appellants' sole argument on appeal is that Draper City

had a duty to place a 40 mph speed limit sign somewhere on the
one mile stretch of road from its southern-most boundary to the
intersection with the private road.
Summary judgment was properly granted by the trial court on
the grounds that Draper City owed no legal duty to Kenneth Snell
to erect such a speed limit sign.

While a governmental entity

has a non-delegable duty to maintain streets within its
boundaries, it has no duty to erect speed limit signs in the
first instance.

Additionally, any duty Draper City owed to erect

speed limit signs is a duty that runs only to the public at
large.

Because there exists no special relationship between

Draper City and Kenneth Snell, there is no individual, legal duty
upon which appellants could base a negligence claim.

Finally,

even if appellants could establish a legal duty, Draper City
would be immune from suit because it did not have control over
both the roads upon which the allegedly dangerous condition existed.
- 2 -

ARGUMENT
I.
DRAPER CITY HAD NO DUTY TO ERECT A TRAFFIC SIGN CONTROLLING
SPEED OR WARNING OF AN INTERSECTION WITH A PRIVATE ROAD
Appellants agree that under Utah law a municipality has "no
common law duty to place a sign . . . warning motorists of [an]
approaching intersection."

De Villiers

1161, 1167 (Utah App. 1994) / see

also,

v.

Utah County,

Jones

v.

834 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah App. 1992).x

Corp.,

Bountiful

In De

882 P.2d
City

Villiers,

plaintiff alleged that a subdivision road had been built by a
private developer and placed at a location that made it difficult
for motorists traveling the county road to see.

No signs had

been posted on the county road advising drivers of the allegedly
dangerous intersection.

The Court in De Villiers

held that, even

assuming the intersection posed an unreasonable risk of danger,
Utah County had no duty to erect warning signs:
Even if the placement of Oakview Drive created a
dangerous condition on 6000 West, Utah County still has
no duty to erect warning signs, even though it has a
duty to maintain that road in a condition reasonably
safe for travel. See Jones,
834 P.2d at 560. Thus,
Utah County had no common law duty to place a sign at
6000 West warning motorists of the approaching
intersection.
De Villiers,

882 P.2d at 1167.

allegations in De Villiers

The parallel between the

and this case is obvious.

Also analogous are the facts in Jones
Corp.,

supra,

v.

Bountiful

in which the plaintiff claimed, inter

alia,

City
that he

was injured in an intersection collision because Bountiful City
x

See page 9 of Appellants' Brief.
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failed to place signs at the intersection despite its knowledge
of prior accidents.

In discussing the duty issue, the Utah Court

of Appeals recognized that the duty of a municipality to exercise
due care in maintaining streets within its corporate boundaries
M

is limited in that 'a city is not generally liable for failure

to install signs or signals.'"

Eugene McQuillin,

Jones,

The Law of Municipal

12 (3d ed. 1985) . The Jones

834 P.2d at 560, citing 19

Corporations

§ 54.02, at

court went on to state "rather than

placing a duty on a municipality to erect traffic control
devices, the common law requires only that once the municipality
takes action to install such devices, it must do so in a nonnegligent manner."

Thus, the Court held that Bountiful City had

"no common law duty to control the intersection with traffic
signs, even if Bountiful was on notice that . . . foliage
obstructed a clear view of the intersection."

Jones,

834 P.2d at

560.
While acknowledging this rule, appellants argue for an
exception that would swallow it.

They argue that because Draper

City placed a speed limit sign at one spot on the roadway, it
must answer to Mr. Snell for not placing a similar sign elsewhere
on the roadway.

The duty to erect a speed limit sign, appellants

argue, is part of its general duty to "regulate the flow of
traffic" undertaken by having placed a speed limit sign
elsewhere.

Semantics cannot cloak the true nature of appellants'

argument -- that Draper City should have placed a speed limit
sign on the east side of the frontage road and south of the
- 4 -

intersection with the private dirt road in question in order to
warn Mr. Snell of the impending intersection.

Indeed, this is

the duty the Court would have to legally impose on Draper City in
order for appellants to be able to proceed with their negligence
claim.
There is simply no Utah precedent to support appellants'
tortured argument.
are Bowan v.
v.

Leavitt,

River

The only supporting cases cited by appellants
ton

City,

656 P. 2d 4 34 (Utah 1982) and

Richards

716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985), both of which involved

previously erected stop signs that had been knocked down and
claims that the governmental entities were negligent in failing
to replace them in a timely manner.

Obviously, these cases are

distinguishable from this case, in which appellants argue that
Draper City should have erected a speed limit sign in the first
instance.
II.
EVEN IF DRAPER CITY HAD A DUTY TO INSTALL A SPEED
LIMIT SIGN IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, IT IS A DUTY TO THE GENERAL
PUBLIC, NOT A DUTY OWED INDIVIDUALLY TO KENNETH SNELL
Recent cases from Utah appellate courts reiterate the rule
that a governmental entity has no duty to a member of the general
public who suffers injury as a result of the entity's alleged
failure to control the conduct of others, unless the injured
person can show a relationship special enough to establish an

individual duty.

Ledfors

v. Emery County School

P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993); Higgins

v.

(Utah 1993) ; Lamarr v. Utah State

Salt

Lake

Department

- 5 -

District,

County,

of

84 9

855 P.2d 231

Transportation,

828 P.2d 535 (Utah App. 1992); Cannon
P.2d 586 (Utah App. 1993).

v.

University

of

866

The essence of the public duty

doctrine is that "a duty to all is a duty to none".
Peterson,

Utah,

813 P.2d 1156, 1165 (Utah 1991).

Rollins

v.

Unless a plaintiff is

owed an individual duty by a governmental entity apart from its
duty to the general public, there is no legal duty upon which the
plaintiff may base a negligence claim.
P.2d 442, 445 (Utah 1993); Lamarr,
The cases of Lamarr

Madsen

v.

Borthick,

850

828 P.2d at 539.

and Cannon demonstrate the applicability

of the "public duty doctrine" to the activity of traffic control.
In Lamarr,

a pedestrian who was struck while walking across an

overpass brought action against Salt Lake City and the Utah
Department of Transportation alleging that Salt Lake City owed
him a duty to maintain a sidewalk on the overpass or to place
signs that would have prevented him from walking on the roadway
and/or that the City had a duty to control the transient
population beneath the overpass so that he was not forced to use
the allegedly dangerous overpass.

The Utah Court of Appeals held

that these allegations failed to allege a duty upon which a
negligence claim could be based.

This Court found that Lamarr

had failed to establish that the City had any reason to
distinguish him from the general public.

There was no allegation

nor evidence that the City had any knowledge whatsoever of
Lamarr's trip across the overpass.

Similarly, in this case,

there is no allegation that Draper City had some special

- 6 -

relationship with Mr. Snell or knowledge of Mr. Snell's
activities which would give rise to an individual duty.
In Cannon,

plaintiffs had parked at a University of Utah

parking lot and were proceeding to the Huntsman Center to a
University of Utah basketball game.

While walking north across

South Campus Drive (a State-owned road, maintained by the Utah
State Department of Transportation), plaintiffs were struck in a
crosswalk.

Two University police officers had been assigned to

the crosswalk.

Summary judgment was granted to the University of

Utah under the public duty doctrine and the Utah Court of Appeals
affirmed, rejecting plaintiffs' argument that they were a
distinguishable sub-group of "pedestrians" narrower than the
"general public".

This Court reasoned that the duty of the

police officers was to ensure the safety of pedestrian travel to
the entire public, not just those pedestrians on their way to the
basketball game.
In their Brief, Snells argue that it does not apply to this
case because "the public duty doctrine governs situations where
the question is whether or not to impose an affirmative duty to
act (or protect) for the benefit of a particular plaintiff.

It

does not govern situations where the governmental entity has
affirmatively undertaken the duty."

Appellants' Brief, p. 12.

This interpretation is not justified by current case law and it
is not surprising that appellants cite no legal authority for
their proposition.

By contrast, De Villiers

speaks to the

identical issue presented in this case and holds that there is no
- 7 -

duty by a governmental entity to erect a sign warning of an
intersection.2
Although Snells decline to discuss De Villiers

anywhere in

their Brief on appeal, they apparently would argue that their
case is different, because their case involves a "speed limit"
sign as distinguished from a sign warning of an impending
intersection.

Any such distinction, however, is one without a

difference in the context of this case.

Logically, the only

reason for appellants to argue that a speed limit sign should
have been placed on the east side of the frontage road and south
of the intersection in question would be to reduce the speed of
travelers in light of the impending intersection.

Thus, in order

for it to mean anything, Snells are forced to argue that the
speed limit sign was necessary because of the intersection.
Placement of a speed limit sign on the east side of the frontage
road but north of the intersection would have been irrelevant to
Mr. Snell on the day of the accident.

Obviously, Snells'

argument in this case is no different than the arguments
presented and rejected in De Villiers

and

Jones.

Finally, appellants argue that this Court should now
abrogate the public duty doctrine and hold that it does not apply
to duties related to traffic regulation.

This Court has recently

and frequently had opportunity to examine the public duty
doctrine in the context of traffic regulation.
v. University

of Utah,

supra;

See, e.g.

Lamarr v. Utah State

2

See discussion of De Villiers
- 8-

Cannon

Department

herein, at page 3.

of

Transportation,

supra.

doctrine is sound.

The policy behind the public duty

To abandon it would subject every

governmental entity to potential liability and require it to
defend every case where a plaintiff or co-defendant argued that
placement of a sign would have prevented third parties from
driving negligently.
III.
DRAPER CITY IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT ALLEGING
NEGLIGENT SIGNAGE AT THE INTERSECTION OF A
PUBLIC ROAD WITH A PRIVATE ROAD
The trial court appropriately considered the legal duty
issue prior to reaching the issue of governmental immunity
proposed by Draper City as an additional grounds for summary
judgment.

As this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have

repeatedly pointed out, the appropriate analysis is to first look
at the question of duty.

If no common law duty exists, there is

no need to reach a governmental immunity issue.

Even so, Utah

law is clear that immunity would exist in this case, even if
legal duty could be established.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 waives governmental immunity for
any injury caused by "defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of
any highway. . . . "

In De Villiers,

the Utah Court of Appeals

specifically held that the waiver of governmental immunity for
unsafe conditions of a highway does not apply unless the
governmental entity has control over the roads or highways upon
which the dangerous condition exists.
1165.

In De Villiers,

De Villiers,

882 P.2d at

as in this case, one of the streets in
- 9 -

question was privately owned.

Thus, the waiver of immunity

provision does not apply to the circumstances of this case.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of law, appellants cannot establish a legal duty
owed to Kenneth Snell by Draper City.

Draper City had no duty to

erect speed limit or warning signs in the one-mile stretch
between its southern border and the intersection with the private
dirt road in question.

Additionally, any duty which it might

have owed to erect a speed limit sign was a duty owed to the
general public and not to Kenneth Snell, who has neither alleged
nor proven a special relationship with Draper City.
duty issue, De Villiers

v.

Utah County

Beyond the

clearly establishes that

Draper City would be protected by governmental immunity.

The

trial court's summary judgment in favor of Draper City should be
affirmed.
DATED this

I Mr

day of July, 1997.
WILLIAMS Sc HUNT

DENNIS C. FERGUSON
Attorneys for Drapet City
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